The aim of this paper is to provide new evidence on the value-creation process taking place in bankruptcy procedures that belong to different legal systems (French civil law, German civil law, and common law): to do so, we assess to which extent the debtor's value can be preserved under bankruptcy by analyzing the recovery rates in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. We use a unique European sample of 900 corporate bankruptcy files that were manually collected in commercial courts on the period 1993-2005. We also contribute to the literature by considering the recovery rates on the various classes of claimants (senior claims, junior claims, and new money) for each bankruptcy procedure. Our main conclusions are: (a) France and Germany show quite similar global recovery rates which are greater than in the UK, (b) when controlling for the quality of assets at the beginning of the procedure and for the structure of claims, we observe the recovery rates are not significantly different between France and the UK, while they remain greater for German companies, (c) Germany has the greatest recovery rates for senior and junior creditors, (d) the reorganization procedure and the liquidation procedure leading to the highest global recovery rate are, respectively, the French continuation and the German liquidation.
I. Introduction
Corporate bankruptcy law has received considerable attention due to its implications, first, on the financing and investing decisions made by the debtors and the creditors, and, second, on the way the competing interests are taken into consideration before and after default. Two complementary aspects of the efficiency of bankruptcy procedures have been investigated so far.
On the one hand, ex-ante efficiency investigates how the bankruptcy law may affect the stakeholders' strategies taking place before default. Following the ex-ante pespective, the legal environment should influence all the more the managers' and the creditors' behavior as information is asymmetric (Aghion and Bolton, 1992), Kolecek, 2008) : the resulting effect is likely to impact on the macroeconomic growth (Berkovitch, Israel, and Zender, 1998) . Additionally, the anticipation of the rules prevailing under bankruptcy may also impact on the design of debt contracts (Gorton and Kahn, 2000) , Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco, 2005), and/or on the way the firms are monitored and financed (Cornelli and Felli, 1997 ).
On the other hand, ex-post efficiency focuses on the ability of bankruptcy procedures to maximize the value of bankrupt firms (or, equivalently, to reduce the losses) by considering all the stakeholders' interests, once default has occurred.
Following the ex-post perspective, one way of resolving default is to settle auction procedures: indeed, these are efficient at revealing private information, and eventually, at creating value for all the stakeholders (Bebchuk, 1998) . In the same way, procedures allowing for deviations from the absolute priority rule may lead to more (or less) ex-post efficient outcomes (Jackson, 1986 , Baird and Picker, 1991 , Blazy and Chopard, 2004 . Thus, focusing on ex-post efficiency is of utmost interest as it helps to appraise the ability of the bankruptcy procedures to preserve the debtor's financial and economic value, or even, to create additional value out of the debtor's initial assets. However, describing the value creation process during bankruptcy would require computing and choosing among continuation and liquidation values of assets. As these assessments are mostly unobservable, proxies have to be used. The literature widely uses the creditors' recovery rate, this being the observable outcome of the valuation process within bankruptcy (Davydenko and Franks, 2008, Grunert and Weber, 2009 ).
In every country, bankruptcy procedures present peculiar characteristics that are likely to impact differently on the creditors' recovery rates. Despite these specifications, bankruptcy procedures should at least fulfill three functions. First, bankruptcy codes help to coordinate the creditors: without such coordination, the distressed firms would be dismantled through an anarchic creditors' run, which eventually would undermine the debtor's recovery value. This common pool problem has been widely addressed by Bulow and Shoven (1978) , Gertner and Scharfstein (1990) , and Longhofer and Peters (2004) . Through various legal mechanisms (stay of claims, voting rules, court enforcement), the design of bankruptcy codes helps in solving this coordination issue. Second, bankruptcy codes provide public information, most of the time thanks to the implementation of more or less sophisticated audit procedures, under the court's supervision. Third, bankruptcy codes help in checking the value of the assets and of the claims: by forcing (or deviating from) absolute priority order (White, 1989 , Hart, 2000 , by checking the various due amounts, by isolating the anterior, posterior, junior, and senior claims, and by transferring the management from the directors to the creditors (Harris and Raviv, 1991) , bankruptcy codes settle specific rules which reduce uncertainty. In a sense, this third characteristic can be viewed as a mix of the two previous ones.
As these characteristics differ from a country to another, one can expect that the various bankruptcy codes may lead to different recovery rates: the aim of this paper is thus to provide new evidence on the ex-post efficiency of bankruptcy procedures by analyzing the recovery rates on three European countries that show strongly distinct bankruptcy codes: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The choice of these countries is quite representative of the main legal traditions prevailing in Europe which are the German civil law, the French civil law and the common law. It prolongs the paper from Davydenko and Franks (2008) who use a sample of bankrupt firms in France, Germany and the UK to explore the effects of bankruptcy codes on lending and reorganization practices. They notably measure and compare the banks' recovery rates on a set of financially distressed firms 1 1 In our paper, we restrict the analysis to bankrupt firms. Indeed, this is the sole practical way of encompassing all classes of claimants, which are observable once formal bankruptcy is triggered off.
. In this area, they find that recovery rates for banks are significantly lower in France than those observed in Germany and in the United Kingdom. However their analysis is limited to one category of creditors:
banks. Therefore, one can wonder what the situation of other creditors is and consequently how much total value is created by the bankruptcy procedures. Indeed banks may benefit from a different recovery rate than other creditors.
The Doing Business Report (2010) provides a more global analysis of the efficiency of bankruptcy codes (World Bank, 2009 ). This report ranks economies on their ease of doing business by considering 10 topics, for which 183 countries are classed in percentiles, with the first percentile being the best. Regarding bankruptcy issues, the report includes the topic "closing a business" which is related to the "recovery rate in bankruptcy". For this indicator, UK is classed in the 9 th percentile while Germany and France are respectively in the 35 th and the 42 th percentile. Thus, according to this study, the UK appears to benefit from a more efficient bankruptcy code than Germany and France. The methodology of this report is based on Djankov et al. (2008) and is based on a case study sent to local insolvency practitioners in all countries.
With our investigation, we aim to challenge this view by providing recovery rates for all creditors on a unique sample of 900 bankruptcy files collected manually in courts on the period 1995-2007. We have gathered information on a large set of variables including firm characteristics, recovered amounts by class of claimants, and cause(s) of default.
As a consequence, our investigation does not rely to one class of creditors like Davydenko and Franks (2008) or to one specific case and the opinion of local insolvency practitioners like the Doing Business Report. We are therefore able to compare the total creation value of the bankruptcy process in these three countries, and then establish a global view of the ex-post efficiency.
We also contribute to the literature by considering the different classes of 
II.1 The bankruptcy code in France
France engaged three successive reforms in the fields of corporate bankruptcy:
initially, in 1985, the French "redressement judiciaire" settled three legal ways of resolving financial distress: liquidation, sale as a going concern, or continuation plan. During the observation period, first, the maintenance of the previous contracts may be forced, and, second, the new creditors are granted a higher position in the priority order (new money). The repayment priority order is quite specific in France, as the last two month unpaid wages benefit from a "superprivilège": whatever the bankruptcy outcome, these should be repaid prior to the bankruptcy costs. Then, comes the new money, the preferential claims, the secured claims . Still, a higher prevention may impact on the firms' financial and economic health when they enter bankruptcy. 3 In France, the outcome is centralized: based on the administrator's report, the court finally decides either to liquidate (which happens in 95% of the cases, according to the Observatoire Consulaire des Entreprises en Difficultés), or to continue the firm, through a reorganization plan (2.5% of the cases), or through a sale , and last, the unsecured creditors. (2.5%). Hence, creditors do not vote or play any significant role in the decision-making process. The anticipated effects of this French specificity are contrasted in terms of efficiency. On the one hand (ex-ante efficiency), leaving the decision to the court may involve suboptimal strategic changes before the default: either delay to fill for bankruptcy, or credit rationing. On the second hand (ex-post efficiency), such centralized mechanism is a powerful coordination tool that reduces the conflicts of interests, and the proliquidation bias from the secured creditors). In addition, this is a simple way to enforce the implicit hierarchy between social and financial objectives, which is a unique feature of the French legislation (Blazy and al. (2007) ).
II.2 The bankruptcy code in Germany
In Germany, the current bankruptcy code is applied since 1999, although it was passed in 1994. It allocates the control rights over the bankrupt firm to creditors under a court's legality supervision. However, when a firm files for bankruptcy, the court appoints first an administrator who performs an audit of the firm's assets and liabilities at default. Based on the audit's results, the administrator makes a recommendation to the court to open or not the procedure.
Indeed, a central characteristic of the German bankruptcy code is that the access to the collective procedure is not automatic. It is in fact subject to a cost coverage provision, i.e. the expected value of remaining assets should be greater to a threshold that may includes different types of costs and claims in order for a procedure to be launched. Consequently, the "grab race" (as analysed, e.g., in Lambrecht and Perraudin (1996) ) for remaining assets is an effective characteristic of the death of German firms. When the case is rejected, civil law applies on a first arrived, first served basis given contractual priority rules and bankrupt firms are finally dissolved.
Before the 1999 reform, the opening threshold included direct bankruptcy costs, which correspond mainly to the administrator's fees . 6 The debtor is not the only agent being entitled to trigger the bankruptcy procedure. Creditors, under some conditions, can also file a firm for bankruptcy. In practice, most procedures are triggered by the debtor. 7 They represent 3.9% in our sample.
II.3 The bankruptcy code in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, corporate bankruptcy was initially ruled by the 8 Today, the Crown is not a preferential creditor anymore. 9 The floating charges are not attached to one specific asset: the value of the assets they encompass may fluctuate over time… When the administrative receivership is triggered, the value of the assets is crystallized. Let's note that some charges may be fixed charges as well, provided the repayment basis is attached to one specific asset.
, the right to appoint a receiver (or an administrative receiver if he/she manages the firm at the same time), whose mission is to protect his/her appointer's interests. Frequently, the receiver's mission is to prepare the firm's liquidation. Thus, 
II.4 Identifying bankruptcy paths
The three bankruptcy codes differ with respect to the different procedures they may offer to the debtor or to creditors to resolve insolvency. Thus, when considering the efficiency of a country's bankruptcy code, it may be of interest to consider the different options provided. Here, Table 1 considers 6 different paths for a bankrupt firm. We define here a path as a three-step process including the triggering, the management and the outcome of the procedure. At this level, for a given path, we identify the legal rules prevailing for each stage that may impact on the value creation in terms of expected recovered amounts. For the French case, we distinguish two paths: continuation and liquidation (piecemeal and sale as a going concern).
Regarding the management of the procedure, the French bankruptcy code promotes continuation. This is the main justification of the observation period. Thus, the design of French bankruptcy law allows for a high degree of flexibility and delay in the potential elaboration of a continuation plan. Provided this flexibility preserves the value of assets, we could expect that the observation period has a positive impact on recoveries. On the contrary, liquidation is the solution by default, most of them being pronounced immediately at the triggering and without any observation period.
However, turning to the triggering, both paths are quite similar.
The German procedure is homogenous in its management and, as discussed earlier, ends overwhelmingly in liquidation. We voluntarily restrict the analysis to open files as unopen files do not reflect a collective bankruptcy process.
Consequently, the German data entails a bias in the overall shape of these firms relatively to the French and UK firms, only firms with sufficient available assets being selected in Germany. However, as we later control for available assets or the coverage ratio at the procedure's opening, the remaining procedure effects can be considered as homogenous across countries.
Finally, we consider three paths under the UK insolvency law: liquidation (as well compulsory as voluntary), administration and receivership. Receivership is certainly the most specific procedure regarding the three countries. Indeed, it is not really a collective procedure: the triggering relies on the willingness of the sole appointer and is not related to some legally defined triggering criteria. In addition, the management of the procedure is in hands of the receiver who has the obligation to serve his appointer's interests. Clearly, this hierarchy of objectives may have an impact (positive or not) on global recoveries whereas one can suspect some negative impact on junior claims. The administration and liquidation procedures, whereas being truly collective, differ in various ways. First, the administration allows for different outcomes (depending on the mission assigned to the administrator) whereas the liquidation procedure is restricted to the sole piecemeal realization of assets.
Second, the coordination mechanism prevailing under administration relies on the creditors' vote which is not the case under liquidation. As the decision-making processes differ, both procedures may have different impacts in terms of recoveries.
III. Sample description
The data in the three countries was hand-collected using information extracted West, Wales and Scotland. The bankrupt firms were identified using the bankruptcy filings announcements published by the London Gazette. Finally, the German sample was collected at three bankruptcy courts (Berlin-Charlottenburg, Freiburg and Frankfurt/Main). Table 2 gives the time and country structure of the sample.
Nevertheless, we control for aggregate economic shocks in the data by introducing the annual growth rate of GDP as a further control variable.
Despite their formal differences, the bankruptcy files contain in many aspects similar information which allowed data collection using a unified template. The available data cover the level and the composition of liabilities, estimated asset values at the time of default, realized recoveries and payments made to creditors.
Moreover, for Germany and the UK, the files contain explicit information about direct bankruptcy costs, which mainly correspond to the administrator's fees. For
France, this information is not part of the file. However, as bankruptcy costs are precisely defined by a regulatory formula based on observable characteristics (recovered amounts…), costs were reconstituted using the regulatory formula and validated by a bankruptcy practitioner. As the files always contain information on the identity of the firm, the firm's age and its legal form are available. Additionally, bankruptcy files can contain accounting information (balance sheets and income statements). However, these data are not always available. In Germany, accounting data are not a mandatory piece in the procedure, so they are not automatically included in the bankruptcy file. When available, accounting data may also to a large extent be outdated. Indeed, 42% of the available accounting data is older than one year and 10% older than two years. Consequently, using even basic accounting figures would have led to substantial losses in data. Table 3 gives an overview of most control variables used in the following sections.
In terms of total liabilities, the bankruptcy cases remain comparable across countries with UK distressed firms having higher total liabilities. Moreover, the files contain generally some qualitative information on the causes of distress. As it may
give some insights in the situation in the firm and underpin the final decision of the creditors or the court, the administrator's report generally gives some indications on the possible causes of default. The information of the causes of default was handcollected from the bankruptcy files using a list of 52 causes put together in 7 main categories: Accident, Finance, Macro, Management, Outlets, Production and Strategy.
As it is difficult to weight the different causes, we construct six dummy variables equal to one if there is at least one cause identified in a given category and zero else.
Unfortunately, some files do not contain any information concerning of bankruptcy.
Assuming that there must be some kind of reason for a business to go bankrupt, we consider the absence of information on the causes as missing data. Table 4 shows the repartition of the data among the six different bankruptcy paths defined in the preceding section. The distribution of the sample does not voluntarily reflect the actual breakdown between procedures in each country in order to achieve consistent estimates in subsequent analyses. Thus, the observations are weighted using each country's repartition of paths. Individual weights are also shown in table 4 11
In cases when the final outcome of the procedure is continuation, the decision takes the form of a continuation plan which contains a provisional plan of payments.
Under continuation, debt reliefs are not allowed even if longer delays may be imposed by the court. Thus, this mechanically impacts on recovery rates. However, the effective recovery rate of creditors depends upon the success of the plan. For the French data, it is possible to identify firms whose continuation failed and those whose . Moreover, we do not distinguish in further analyses between the two UK procedures of compulsory and voluntary liquidation. 11 Remind that for France, we assume that sale as a going concern can be assimilated to liquidation when considering the creditor's point of view as they receive the sale's proceeds.
continuation plan ended successfully. However, some cases are still pending and should be considered as truncated data. Based on the failed and closed plans, we observe that 89% of continuation plans are successful. We apply this probability to the discounted cash-flows initially planned using the French Treasury term structure.
For UK data, all files end either in piecemeal liquidation or sale. Finally, this point is irrelevant when considering the German data as all firms in our sample are finally liquidated.
The different bankruptcy codes differ considerably in the scope and the depth of rights they confer to given creditors in the collective procedure. In order to compare the structure of liabilities as well the recovery rates, we aggregate creditors to three categories: junior, senior and new money claims. New money claims are those arising posterior the opening of a bankruptcy procedure. They generally enjoy a superpriority over existing claims. Senior claims gather all claims borne before bankruptcy but who enjoy some form of priority due to the bankruptcy code or based on some form of collateral. Junior claims are the remaining claims. Note that for some types of collateral or because he/she continues to finance the firm during bankruptcy, a given creditor may appear simultaneously in the several categories. However, statistics on the liabilities' structure as well on recovery rates are left for section 4.
IV. Testing for the creation of value: analysis and results
This section presents the results of our comparative analysis of recovery rates between the three countries. We start with a comparison of the mean recovery rates and follow with econometric estimations.
IV.1 A comparison of the mean recovery rates
We first present the mean recovery rates to check the existence of significant differences among countries and among procedures. We now turn to the analysis of the mean recovery rates at the procedure level. In all countries, the liquidation procedure is by far the most commonly chosen.
), both countries have greater overall recovery rates than the UK (13.82%).
The analysis by class of creditors interestingly allows a thorough investigation of the recovery rates. The recovery rate for senior and junior creditors is clearly higher in Germany (76.71% and 10.10% respectively) than in both other countries with similar levels (35.28% and 5.82% for France, and 30.84% and 6.03% for the UK).
Finally, new money creditors obtain approximately 100% of their claims in the UK, while their recovery rate is 78.58% in Germany and only 53.34% in France.
However, the observed differences in the overall recovery rate and the recovery rates by creditors' categories can not solely be attributed to differences in the efficiency of the respective bankruptcy codes. Indeed, three hypotheses can be presented to explain the differences in recovery rates. The first hypothesis deals with the quality of assets at the beginning of the procedure. If companies enter in the bankruptcy procedure in better shape, creditors will recover more. The second hypothesis is based on the structure of claims. The overall recovery rate may for instance be influenced by a greater share of senior creditors among creditors. Finally, the third hypothesis is the fact that a procedure can create more value than others. The hypotheses 1 and 2 can be investigated by analyzing the quality of assets and the structure of claims, while the hypothesis 3 is studied residually. The analysis by procedure helps understanding the global results. As the liquidation procedure is the dominant one in all countries, the recovery rates for junior and for senior creditors for the British liquidation procedure explain the observed mean recovery rates at the national level.
In a nutshell, the main finding of the analysis of the recovery rates is the lower recovery rate in the UK in comparison with Germany and more particularly France.
This conclusion is antagonistic with the view that the ex-post efficiency of the British bankruptcy law would be greater than the French one (La Porta and al. [1997] ).
We can nonetheless wonder whether this finding may be explained by the situation of firms entering in the bankruptcy process in each country. Indeed France for instance might benefit from a greater quality of assets for bankrupt firms. To check this aspect, we provide the coverage rate, e.g. the ratio of assets at the opening of the procedure divided by due claims, for each procedure in table 7.
We observe very big differences between countries for the coverage rate. This rate is the greatest for the French continuation procedure (74.04%) but it is also relatively high for the French liquidation procedure (53%) in comparison with the German procedure (27.38%) and British procedures (17.37% for the liquidation and between 31 and 36% for both other procedures). Therefore, we can stress the better quality of assets for French companies than for British and German companies. This observation may explain the greater recovery rate in France than in the UK. Thus, given available assets, the UK bankruptcy code could still be more ex post efficient than the French law.
Nevertheless the analysis of the recovery rates must be completed by an econometric analysis to assess carefully the hypotheses on the differences in recovery rates and therefore to correctly interpret the results.
IV.2 Estimations
We now turn to regressions to go deeper into our findings about the comparative recovery rates between countries and between procedures. Our idea here is to disentangle the three hypotheses on the differences between recovery rates by controlling for the quality of assets (first hypothesis) and the structure of claims (second hypothesis) to check whether significant differences in recovery rates remain between countries and procedures which can be considered as resulting from a greater creation value from the procedure (third hypothesis).
We first present models explaining the overall recovery rate, meaning without considering separately the creditor classes. We consider two models with one taking countries into account, while the other focuses on procedures. The explanatory variables of primary concern are countries in the first model, meaning dummy variables for France and Germany so that the coefficients of these variables are interpreted in comparison with the United Kingdom, and procedures in the second model, meaning variables for all procedures with the exception of the British liquidation to which all procedures have to be compared with. Table 8 shows the results of tobit regressions of the overall recovery rates.
Model 1 is a country model introducing national dummies for France and Germany.
Model 2 is a procedure model introducing procedure dummies using UK liquidation as the reference point. In addition, the weight of new money and senior creditors in total due amounts are introduced in order to control for the effect of the structure of claims on recovery rates. Moreover, the coverage ratio is introduced in order to control for the financial shape of the firm at the triggering of the procedure.
Additional control variables are age, GDP growth, a limited liability dummy and the bankruptcy causes as defined in section 2.
In the first model, we observe that the dummy variable for Germany is significantly positive while it is not significant for France. These results consequently mean that, when quality of assets and structure of claims are controlled for, we do not observe yet a greater recovery rate for France than for the UK, even if it remains significantly higher in Germany.
Therefore, the hypothesis according to which the value creation would be greater is validated for Germany in comparison with both other countries, but not in France relative to the UK. However it is of utmost interest to notice that, even when we control for other influences, we do not observe any advantage in recovery rate for the UK in comparison with France, in opposition with former reports showing a greater efficiency of bankruptcy procedures in the UK.
In the second model, we investigate the differences among procedures. We observe that three procedures have a significantly greater recovery rate than the These results also corroborate those observed at the country level, as the hierarchy between the liquidation procedures, representing most bankruptcy cases, is in line with the hierarchy for countries.
The comparison of mean recovery rates above has shown a greater recovery rate for the French liquidation than for the British liquidation, which is not observed anymore in the regression. This means that this result may have been notably influenced by the differences in quality of assets between both countries.
We now turn to the analysis of control variables. As expected, the coverage rate exerts a positive and significant influence on the recovery rate. The weight of senior creditors in due amounts has also a positive impact on recovery rates. This could be related to the existence of assets that could be pledged as collateral. Indeed, the presence of senior creditors may be directly related to the existence of assets whose quality make them eligible as collateral. These assets could then have a higher value in the liquidation process, leading to higher recovery rates. Moreover, the share of new money claims in due amounts has also a positive effect on recovery rates. This suggests that creditors benefit from the existence of new money during the procedure.
Moreover, the weight of new money creditors could also be considered as an effect of the procedure, i.e. as an aspect of its ex post efficiency. Otherwise, the only significant control variables are the cause of default "Management" and the limited liability which is negatively associated with the recovery rate. This latter finding can be explained by the fact that limited liability enhances the incentives to do some moral hazard behaviour for managers.
At this stage, both models show that after having controlled for differences in asset quality and the structure of claims, there remain significant differences across countries and procedures in their ability to increase recovery rates.
However, as shown in table 5, there are also sizeable differences in recovery rates when comparing recovery rates of different creditors across countries and procedures. In order to test for differences in the recovery rates among creditor classes are different, we to adopt a different methodology, as recovery rates for one creditor class can be influenced by those for others. More specifically, following the priority rules, recovered amounts by junior creditors are influenced by those obtained by senior and new money creditors, whereas those for new money creditors matter for senior creditors. Therefore, we estimate a simultaneous equations model incorporating interdependencies between recovered amounts for creditor classes.
The model includes three equations all explaining the recovered sums for one class of creditors. The results are displayed in table 9. The key explanatory variables are the due sums for the classes of creditors. In order to investigate the differences across bankruptcy paths, we model their ability to achieve higher recoveries given due amounts. At this aim, we introduce interaction terms between due amounts and path dummies. For instance, when investigating the impact of the procedure on recovered sums for junior creditors, we create the variable Lduejuniorfrliq which are the product of the due sums to junior creditors multiplied by a dummy variable equal to one whether the procedure was a French liquidation. We similarly create a variable for each procedure. As we consider the log values of due and recovered amounts for the different categories of creditors, the regression coefficients measure the elasticity of recovered amounts with regard to due amounts. Thus, the regression coefficients measure the ability of a bankruptcy procedure (in a country) to provide higher recoveries given the structure of liabilities. A higher (and statistically significant) coefficient is then associated to a higher ex post efficiency level. Table 10 complements the regression results by providing difference tests between procedures for each category of creditors.
In addition to the due amounts of claims, we introduce the recovered amounts Although we have controlled for available assets at the beginning of the procedure, there remains a significant difference between the German and the two other liquidation procedures when considering junior creditors. However, the opening decision in German law could be related to other non observable factors such as the complexity of the creditors' pool or the type of assets. These factors may lead to the selection of bankrupt firms that are most likely to benefit of the coordination and information gains of a collective procedure, thus leading to ex post efficient outcomes.
When turning to senior creditors, and consistent with the results for junior creditors, the French continuation and the German procedure bring the greatest recovered sums. Moreover, the UK is the worst country for recovery rates for senior creditors, as the three British procedures are those providing the smallest recovered sums for a given level of due sums with by decreasing order the receivership, the administration, and the liquidation, whereas the French liquidation is between both groups of procedures. Indeed, when considering the three UK procedures, the receivership appears to be the most ex post efficient procedure for senior creditors (table 10 shows that the differences are statistically significant at the 10% level). This is consistent with the fact that the receivership procedure was designed for the benefit of the floating charge holder. Moreover, the relative ex post efficiency of the UK liquidation for junior creditors disappears when considering senior creditors. Indeed, it appears to be the less efficient path, in particular when compared to French liquidation. Third, in line with the almost 100% recovery rate observed before, the British procedures are those providing the highest recovered sums for the new money creditors. However, table 6 showed that new money claims are scarce in the UK. This could be interpreted as a very conservative use of additional finance in bankruptcy resolution in the UK. Moreover, the elasticity of recovered amounts to due amounts for new money claims are statistically higher in the UK than in Germany. Table 6 also indicates that Germany is the country where new money financing is most important (about 10% of total claims at the end of the procedure). This could also suggest that one explanation of the observed efficiency of the German bankruptcy code could be related to the decision to take benefit from the temporary continuation of the firm. 
V. Conclusion
This paper has presented new evidence on the value creation by bankruptcy codes through a comparison of the laws in France, Germany, and the UK. Our investigation leads to the following conclusions. First, France and Germany have quite similar overall recovery rates which exceed the British one. This finding is partly explained by the better quality of assets at the beginning of the procedure in France than in both other countries. We also observe that the structure of claims strongly differs among countries with notably a more important share of senior claims in France. Regressions controlling for these factors then lead to the finding that recovery rates are not significantly different between France and the UK, while they are greater for German companies. Consequently, we provide support to the fact that the French bankruptcy code creates as much value as the British code, while the German is more efficient in that dimension.
Second, claimants do not recover the same sums in all countries, with recovery rates for senior and junior creditors higher in Germany than in both other countries, and greater recovery rate for new money creditors. Regression models controlling for other influences confirm that the German bankruptcy code is the best for junior and senior creditors.
Third, the comparison of procedures shows that the French bankruptcy code provides the procedure with the highest recovery rate (the French continuation) while, among the liquidation procedures, the German one is associated with the greater recovery rate.
Thus, when looking for evidence on the ex-post efficiency of bankruptcy codes, the main conclusion of our analysis is that the French one creates as much value as the British one, while the German one is more efficient. This finding may appear at first glance antagonistic with former studies supporting notably the view that claimants recover more in the UK than in France (World Bank, 2009; Davydenko and Franks, 2008) . However our investigation is the first one to our knowledge providing recovery rates on a large set of collected bankruptcy files with information for all categories of claimants for these three European countries. Therefore, our methodology differs than the Doing Business Report based on the opinion of local insolvency practitioners.
Furthermore our results corroborate in fact those from Davydenko and Franks (2008) focusing on one class of claimants, banks. Thus, our study suggests developing new research on collected bankruptcy files to have a wider view of the value creation of the bankruptcy code.
-27 -- -Depending on the type of liquidation, the procedure can be triggered by either the debtor of the creditors. -Depending on the type of liquidation, the triggering criteria is either free of relies on specific criteria (illiquidity, no activity, less than 2 associates).
-The firm is managed by the liquidator. -The liquidator checks the value of the assets and of the various claims.
-The outcomes of liquidation and/or sale are the definitive basis for the creditors' repayment. -The firm may be either piecemeal liquidated and/or sold as a going concern (partially or not). -There is no specific triggering criteria (freely assessed by the appointer).
-The firm is managed by the administrative receiver.
-The firm's management prioritizes the appointer's interests over the other creditors' ones.
-Finally, the debtor is reorganized, or (more likely) liquidated.
-The secured creditors are prior to the appointer in possession of a floating charge. 
